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“Here then [with the introduction of the Research Assessment Exercise] was a dramatic 




Over twenty years ago Elson suggested that ‘the leadership of the [practicing] legal 
profession [in the USA needs to]…use their considerable authority to compel law schools to 
change’, thereby implicitly accepting that the control of university legal education in the 
USA lay, at that time, in the hands of legal academics.2  Whatever the merits of Elson’s 
arguments, his intervention illustrates the general importance that is attached to the 
question of who controls university legal education.  Control has both important policy 
consequences about the direction that such education takes as well as ethical significance, 
indicating who has ultimate responsibility for those consequences.  In this essay I will 
explore the question of who controls university legal education in England and Wales.  
Whilst the arguments in this essay are limited to universities in England and Wales the 
issues they raise are relevant to all other jurisdictions.  However, great care is necessary 
when comparing university legal education in different jurisdictions, with the relationship 
between academics, practitioners and the state being ‘a unique configuration in every 
country’.3  One of the arguments put forward here is that what has happened, and is 
happening, in England and Wales will be of general interest even though the particulars in 
England and Wales are not precisely replicated elsewhere.4    
 
The Legal Position of Universities and Academics in England and Wales 
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Upon its face the answer to the question who controls university legal education in England 
and Wales is clear.  Legally, universities in England and Wales are, and always have been, 
autonomous bodies; they are not creatures of the state.  The first British university, the 
University of Oxford, emerges in the 13th century as a medieval corporation.5  Similarly 
modern-day British universities are ‘a peculiar kind of legal entity, probably best described 
as a corporation’.6  With their own legal personality individual universities are free, within 
the limits of the law, to choose what they do.  The legal position of their academic staff is a 
little less clear. 7  However, ‘academic staff of the pre-1992 universities always enjoyed quite 
different terms of employment from the majority of their co-workers’.8  Even in the present 
day the unusual status of academics is recognised by the fact that academic freedom in 
performance of their duties with respect to research and teaching is protected by statute.9  
Academics are not simply employees but are also members of their University as a 
corporate body.10  The independent status of academics has led the courts to conclude that, 
whilst they are under a contractual duty to do research, ‘preparing specific and definable 
scholarly papers and books, would be outside the course of the academic's employment and 
[as a result] he would retain copyright as the author of these works’.11 Similarly, whilst 
 
5 MB Hackett ‘The University as a Corporate Body’ in Trevor Aston (ed) The History of the 
University of Oxford: Volume 1: The Early Oxford Schools (Clarendon Press, 1984). “Emerges” 
because like other early European universities it is neither possible precisely to date when it 
first starts or when it first becomes a corporation (see, for example, Gaines Post ‘Parisian 
Masters as a Corporation, 1200-1246’ (1934) (Speculum 421-425).  On the general legal 
position of European universities at this time see Ann Monotti and Sam Ricketson 
Universities and Intellectual Property: Ownership and Exploitation (Oxford University Press, 
2003) 20.    
6 Nicola Hart ‘What is a University as a Legal Entity?’ in David Palfreyman and David Warner 
(eds) Higher Education Law (Jordans, 2002) 28. 
7 The contractual position of academics provides a paradigmatic example of the conceptual 
problems caused by employment law jurisprudence which finds its roots the historical 
notion of master and servant, a somewhat implausible model for many modern workers 
including academics.   On this problem see Jon Clarke and Lord Wedderburn ‘Modern 
Employment Law: Problems, Function and Policies’ in Lord Wedderburn, Roy Lewis and Jon 
Clarke (eds) Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund (Clarendon Press, 
1983) 145-152 and Otto Kahn-Freund ‘Blackstone’s Neglected Child: The Contract of 
Employment’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 508. 
8 Dennis Farrington and David Palfreyman The Law of Higher Education (Oxford University 
Press, 2012, 2nd ed) 238. 
9 S 202(2)(a) Education Reform Act 1998. 
10 See, for example, Thomas v University of Bradford [1987] 2 AC 795 at 807, R v Lord 
President of the Privy Council ex parte Page [1991] AC 682 at 694 and Pearce v University of 
Aston (no 2) [1991] 2 All ER 469 at 473. 
11 Andreas Rahmatian ‘Make the Butterflies Fly in Formation? Management of Copyright 
Created by Academics in UK Universities’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 709 at 716, citing a Court 
of Appeal decision Stevenson Jordan v MacDonald and Evans [1952] (1952) 69 RPC 10 at 18.  
See similarly William Cornish ‘Rights in university innovations: the Herchel Smith lecture for 
academics are under a contractual duty to teach, allocating them wholly new teaching 
without consultation, even if they were qualified to do that teaching, would amount to 
constructive dismissal.12  In relation to both research and teaching the courts treat 
academics as autonomous professionals who are employed but who are largely free to 
determine how they fulfil their duties.13 
   
The legal status of universities and academics suggests that control of university legal 
education rests with universities and, perhaps, their individual academic staff.  Yet, despite 
this relatively clear legal picture, there is a long-established and still growing literature 
which suggests that universities and academics no longer have the ability to determine their 
own direction.14  Universities, this literature suggests, are hemmed in by regulation and 
universities in turn tightly control the performance of their academic staff.  If this is so the 




There are a large range of regulatory regimes that relate to universities and academics in 
England and Wales.  Some like the Research Assessment Exercise, now the Research 
Excellence Framework, are longstanding.15  Others, like the Office for Students, set up by 
Part 1 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017, are very new.16  The existence of 
each individual regime is pertinent for the arguments in this essay.  However also relevant is 
the fact of the multiplicity of the regimes.  In addition to the regimes already mentioned the 
Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, Research England, the Office of the 
Independent Adjudicator, the Competition and Markets Authority, UK Visas and 
Immigration (part of the Home Office) and the Advertising Standards Authority are all part 
 
1991’ (1992) 14 European Intellectual Property Review 13 at 15.  For a contrary view see 
Monotti and Ricketson op cit 273-274.  
12 Allen v Queen Mary University of London [2016] WL 02997048 at para 15.  It should be 
noted that this is an Employment Tribunal decision. 
13 In doing this the courts’ views reflect academics own conception of themselves.  See, for 
example, Jane Broadbent ‘If You Can’t Measure It, How Can You Manage IT? Management 
and Governance in Higher Educational Institutions’ (2007) 27 Public Money and 
Management 193 at 195 and Fiona Cownie Legal Academics: Culture and identities (Hart 
Publishing, 2004) 105-105.  Over half of Cownie’s respondents said that autonomy was the 
thing that they valued most about their academic lives.  
14 In relation to law schools in England and Wales see, for example, Richard Collier ‘The 
Changing University and the (Legal) Academic Career – Rethinking the ‘Private Life’ of the 
Law School’ (2002) 22 Legal Studies 1, Richard Collier ‘Privatizing the University and the New 
Political Economy of Socio-Legal  Studies: Remaking the (Legal) Academic Subject’ (2013) 40 
Journal of Law and Society 450 and Richard Collier ‘”Love Law, Love Life”: Neo-Liberalism, 
Wellbeing and Gender in the Legal Profession – The Case of the  Law School’ (2014) 17 Legal 
Ethics 202. 
15 This form of regulation goes back to the 1980s.  On the genesis of the exercise see Maurice 
Hogan and Stephen Hanney Reforming Higher Education (Jessica Kingsley, 2000) 96-98.  
For the next iteration of the exercise see https://www.ref.ac.uk/. 
16 On the Office for Students see https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/. 
of the landscape for contemporary universities in England and Wales.17  The Research 
Excellence Framework is now mirrored by the Teaching Excellence Framework.18  The 
landscape sometimes changes.  Thus, for example, the Office for Students and Research 
England recently replaced the Higher Education Funding Council for England and the Office 
for Fair Access.  However, notwithstanding such alterations, regulation itself has become a 
constant feature for universities in England and Wales and there is no indication that this is 
likely to change in the foreseeable future.  When analysing the impact of this regulation in 
addition to the number of regulatory regimes that relate to universities it is also necessary 
to consider the level of detail in those regimes.  Thus, for example, despite its relatively 
short existence, a little more than 8 months at the time of writing, the Office for Students 
has issued four Regulatory Notices, which are formal requirements made of universities, and 
11 statements entitled Regulatory Advice.19  The content of these various documents 
includes, for example, references to access arrangements for students, ways of facilitating 
students’ registration for national and local elections and how publication of numbers of 
university staff being paid over £100,000 per annum should be accomplished.   
 
From the above it might seem that universities in England and Wales are now much like 
Gulliver bound by the Lilliputians.20  This being so the legal position of universities may seem 
to be of little moment.  Consideration of the history of some of the earliest regulatory 
regimes however suggests a more complex story. 
 
The Quality Assurance Agency 
 
In 1997 the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) ‘was established as an independent company 
and registered as a charity’.21  The Agency’s remit was not wholly new in higher education in 
England and Wales.  Polytechnics, for example, had come under the tutelage of the Council 
for National Academic Awards, a body who were there to ‘guarantee standards’ in 
polytechnics and whose ‘central concern was with…the negotiation, approval and 
reapproval of courses through explicit validation procedures’.22  However polytechnics, 
whilst they provided higher education, were precisely not universities.  Once they became 
universities, following the passage of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, they 
ceased to come under the jurisdiction of the CNAA, which was itself abolished by the 1992 
Act.  Universities have long sought to maintain their autonomy from forms of external audit 
 
17 On these bodies see respectively http://www.qaa.ac.uk/, https://re.ukri.org/, 
http://www.oiahe.org.uk/, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-
and-markets-authority, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-visas-and-
immigration and https://www.asa.org.uk/. 
18 https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-guidance/teaching/what-is-the-tef/.  
19 https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-guidance/regulation/the-regulatory-
framework-for-higher-education-in-england/regulatory-notices-and-advice/. 
20 Jonathan Swift Gulliver’s Travels (JM Dent & Sons, 1975) 15-16.  
21 Ted Tapper The Governance of British Higher Education (Springer, 2007) 181. 
22 Harold Silver A Higher Education: The Council for National Academic Awards and British 
Higher Education (The Falmer Press, 1990) 8 and 90. 
that were outside their control.23    However the 1992 Act which, amongst other things set 
up Funding Councils for the universities, also obliged those Councils to assess the quality of 
education in universities and to set up bodies to advise them with respect to this.24   
 
John Randall, the first Chief Executive of the QAA, was keen to establish its independence 
from universities themselves as much as from anyone else.  In 1998 he wrote that ‘the 
comfortable days are gone: the new stakeholding public no longer accepts the legitimacy of 
unaccountable priesthoods’.25  In 1969 Perkins had written that ‘[u]niversity teaching is the 
key profession in the twentieth century’.26  By 2000 Randall, writing as Chief Executive of 
the QAA, seemed to doubt whether academics were professionals.  He would only go as far 
as saying that ‘[u]niversity teaching has the opportunity to demonstrate that it is worthy of 
recognition as a true professional activity’.  Only if it did that would have ‘earned the right to 
play a part in the regulation of…[its] own activities’.27  That right to play a part in regulation 
would be earned by subscribing to the standards laid down by the QAA.  Brown writes of 
Randall’s ‘enthusiastic espousal of a “tougher” regulatory regime’.28   
 
The Law Benchmark 
 
 
23 Individual universities had long appointed external examiners but the universities 
determined both their appointment and what they did with their reports.  Price dates 
attempts to challenge the autonomy of universities back to the Second World War (Geoffrey 
Price ‘The Expansion of British Universities and their Struggle to Maintain Autonomy: 1943-
46) (1978) Minerva 357).  Goodlad goes even further back suggesting that the ‘first step 
along a dangerous path to State control of universities was taken in a Treasury Minute of 
1919 that established the University Grants Committee’ (Sinclair Goodlad ‘Benchmarking 
and Templates – Some Notes and Queries from a Sceptic’ in Helen Smith, Michael 
Armstrong and Sally Brown (eds) Benchmarking and Threshold Statements in Higher 
Education (Kogan Page, 1999) 72). 
24 On this history see Roger Brown Quality Assurance in Higher Education: The UK Experience 
since 1992 (RoutledgeFalmer, 2004) chp 6 and Tapper op cit pp 167-180.  For a recent 
description of the work of the QAA see Anthony McClaran ‘The Quality Assurance Agency’ in 
Roger Ellis and Elaine Hogard (eds) Handbook of Quality Assurance for University Teaching 
(Routledge, 2019). 
25 Quoted in Colin Raban ‘Assurance versus enhancement: less is more?’ (2007) 31 Journal of 
Further and Higher Education 77 at 79.  On the inappropriateness of using the notion of 
stakeholders when analysing the work of universities see Anthony Bradney “Stakeholders in 
the University Law School: A Note in Dissent” in Fiona Cownie (ed) Stakeholders and the 
University Law School (Hart Publishing, 2010) 225. 
26 Harold Perkins Key Profession (Augustus M Kelley, 1969) 1. 
27 John Randall ‘A Profession for the New Millennium’ in Peter Scott (ed) Higher Education 
Re-formed (Falmer Press, 2000) 168.  
28 Brown op cit 147. 
One of the ways in which the QAA sought to fulfil its duties was by establishing a series of 
Benchmarks for each academic discipline.29  The QAA wanted Benchmarks to ‘describe the 
nature of study and the academic standards expected of graduates in specific subject areas. 
They [should] show what graduates might reasonably be expected to know, do and 
understand at the end of their studies’.30    John Bell, a member of the first group to draft a 
Benchmark for Law, itself one of the first Benchmarks drafted, noted the potential problem 
with a Benchmark.  A Benchmark could become a ‘national curriculum…[something that] 
professionals in higher education [did not] wish to see imposed’.31  There is no doubt that 
those who drafted the first Law Benchmark sought to work within the pluralistic way that 
law has been taught in England and Wales for many decades.32  Nevertheless they also had 
to grapple with the fact that ‘[w]hatever its detailed content, it [a Benchmark] must, by its 
nature, set limits.33  The educational justification for some of the limits set by the first Law 
Benchmark was not always readily apparent.  Thus, for example, the first Law Benchmark, 
like almost all other Benchmarks of its time, said that law graduates should have acquired 
teamworking skills.  Whilst such skills might be useful if graduates were seen as potential 
employees what they had to do with knowledge of or understanding of law was less 
obvious.  Why, on pedagogic grounds, misanthropes should be prevented from graduating 
in law was not made clear.34  In this and some other respects the Law Benchmark seemed to 
subtly limit the autonomy of individual university law schools to decide what and how they 
wanted to teach.35   
 
 
29 On the place of Benchmarks in the QAA’s philosophy see Laura Bellingham ‘Quality 
Assurance and the Use of Subject Level Reference Points in the QAA’ (2008) 14 Quality in 
Higher Education 265 at 269-274. 
30 https://www.qaa.ac.uk/quality-code/subject-benchmark-statements. 
31 John Bell ‘Benchmarking; A Pedagogically Valuable Process?’ (1999) 2 Web Journal of 
Current Legal Issues 
(http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/1999/issue2/bell2.html).  The possibility 
of Benchmarks becoming a national curriculum has been of general concern for academics.  
See, for example, Steve Pidcock ‘What is the impact of subject benchmarking’ (2006) 7 
Active Learning in Education 111 at 117 and 123 and Goodlad op cit 78. 
32 This has not always been the case with other Benchmarks.  Thus, for example, it been 
argued that the Economics Benchmark does not represent the full range of views about 
economics as an academic discipline.  See, for example, Alan Freeman ‘The economists of 
tomorrow: the case for a pluralist subject benchmark statement for economics’ (2009) 8 
International Review of Economics 23. 
33 Anthony Bradney ‘Benchmarking: A Pedagogically Valuable Process? An Alternative View’ 
(1992) 2 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 
(http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/1999/issue2/bradney2.html). 
34 On see further Bradney, 1992 op cit. 
35 Benchmarks had no impact on individual academic autonomy because they described 
what a graduate could be expected to know because of their degree programme as a whole 
and do not what individual academics did in their own teaching.  Of course a problem would 
result if all the members of a department declined to teach in a way that was 
commensurate with a Benchmark’s expectations.  
Whilst the content of the first Law Benchmark might arguably be seen as a constraint on 
Randall’s ‘unaccountable priesthood’ the manner in which it was arrived at largely indicates 
the continuing power of that priesthood.  The members of the original benchmarking group 
were, with one exception, legal academics.36  In 2007, when the Law Benchmark was 
revised, the members of the new working group were all academics.  By 2015, when the 
Benchmark was revised for a second time the membership of the group had somewhat 
altered.  A much enlarged group when compared with the first two bodies had three 
members who represented professional bodies for practicing lawyers and one person who 
was listed as an employers’ representative.  Three members of the QAA were also listed as 
members of the group.  However the 17 other members of the revising group were all from 
universities.37  The priesthood dominated all three exercises.38  Revising the Benchmark has 
enabled adjustments to be made which mean that the Benchmark is now even more closely 
aligned with actual academic practice in university law schools.  Thus, for example, no 
mention is made of teamworking in the 2015 Law Benchmark; instead the Benchmark 
merely says that law schools should be ‘be clear with students about the benefits and limits 
of cooperative learning’.39   
 
Even the 2015 Law Benchmark sets limits on what law schools can do.  One obvious example 
of this is the fact that law schools are now expected to give students opportunities to 
discuss ‘ethical questions and dilemmas that arise in law and to consider the features of 
ethical decision making’.40  An academic, who looks at law from a pure doctrinal 
perspective, seeking to explicate rules from the internal evidence offered by precedents and 
statute, will not think that analysis of values falls within the purview of what they seek to 
do.  It is this doctrinal perspective that has historically dominated law schools in England 
and Wales even though it does not have the same hold that it once had.41  Given this, as a 
member of the 2015 working group, even though I do not think the doctrinal position is 
intellectually tenable, I was somewhat uncomfortable when this formulation was circulated 
 
36 The sole exception being a representative of a professional practicing body. 
37 https://www.qaa.ac.uk/quality-code/subject-benchmark-
statements?indexCatalogue=document-search&searchQuery=Law&wordsMode=AllWords. 
38 In 1999 Brennan suggested that standards in Benchmarks might be set by those from pre-
1992 rather than post-1992 universities (quoted in Brown op cit at 141-142).  Membership 
of the various Law Benchmark groups does not suggest that this has been the case in Law.  9 
of the academic members of the first 2000 Benchmarking group were from pre-1992 
universities and 4 were from post-1992 universities with the chair of the group being from a 
pre-1992 university.  However, in the second 2007 group membership was divided equally 
between pre and post-1992 universities with the chair being from a post-1992 university.  In 
the third 2015 group the chair was once again from a post-1992 university and 11 of the 
academic members were from post-1992 universities with only six being from pre-1992 
universities (https://www.qaa.ac.uk/quality-code/subject-benchmark-
statements?indexCatalogue=document-search&searchQuery=Law&wordsMode=AllWords). 
39 Law Benchmark op cit 3.2. 
40 Law Benchmark op cit 1.4.  
41 Cownie, 2004, op cit, 54-58. 
to law schools as a draft.42  I was, however, surprised when no law school complained about 
this aspect of the draft.43  The explanation for this may lie in the comparative demise of 
doctrinal law with no law school feeling that it would not have academics who wished to 
explore these matters with students.   Alternatively, it may reflect the comparative lack of 
interest that most academics and law schools have in the Law Benchmark.44  Either answer 
suggests that whilst the Law Benchmark regulates law schools it does not do so very tightly.  
 
The QAA and Institutional Audit 
 
The Benchmark was neither the only nor even the most important part of the QAA’a 
proposed regulatory regime.  Institutional audit and assessment were also to be part of the 
picture.  By 1997 such interventions were not new to English and Welsh universities.  For 
example, law schools had been one of the first subject areas which had been subject to an 
external audit of the quality of their teaching.  In 1993 and 1994 small groups of assessors 
consisting of legal academics and usually one non-academic had visited each law school, 
looked at documentation provided by the law school and sat in on some teaching sessions.  
After this they then judged the law school’s teaching as Excellent, Satisfactory or 
Unsatisfactory and published a report on the law school.   The process had been time 
consuming for law schools.  It had produced little discernible benefit with comparison of the 
published reports failing to explain why some schools had been graded as Excellent and 
others as Satisfactory.45  The experience in law schools was replicated in other disciplines.  
Whilst some saw merit in the assessment process others were concerned about its cost and 
its potential threat to academic autonomy.46 
 
Previous experience in the universities of institutional audit and assessment was one of the 
reasons that the QAA was faced with a ‘difficult inheritance’ when it was first founded.47  By 
1997 universities wanted a reduction in audit.  This did not seem to match John Randall’s 
 
42 On the fundamental problems inherent in the doctrinal approach see Anthony Bradney 
Conversations, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-First Century 
(Hart Publishing, 2003) 98-101. 
43 This is not because law schools were unaware that the Benchmark was being 
reconsidered.  Many responses to the consultation exercise were received. 
44 In Cownie’s 2004 account of the lives of legal academics no mention is made of the Law 
Benchmark (Cownie, 2004 op cit).  This is because none of Cownie’s respondents raised the 
subject (personal communication from the author).  Legal academics are not unusual in this 
respect.  In a survey of academic attitudes to audit and quality assurance Cheng found that 
many of the academics that she interviewed across a range of disciplines were not familiar 
with the content of Benchmarks (Ming Cheng ‘Audit cultures and quality assurance 
mechanisms in England: a study of their perceived impact on the work of academics’ (2010) 
15 Teaching in Higher Education 259 at 264). 
45 See further Anthony Bradney "The Quality of Teaching Quality Assessment in English 
Law Schools" The Law Teacher (1996) 150.  Only one law school was graded as 
Unsatisfactory in the exercise. 
46 For an analysis of the process see Brown op cit chp 4. 
47 Brown op cit 118.  For an assessment of the QAA’s place in the politics of higher 
education see Anthony Bradney ‘The Quality Assurance Agency and the Politics of Audit’ 
(2001) 28 Journal of Law and Society 430. 
view of the QAA’s role.  The relationship between universities and the QAA proved to be 
fractious in its early years.  Thus, for example, in 1998 a number of universities, including 
Cambridge, Newcastle and Oxford, were reported as resisting attempts by the QAA to 
scrutinise them.48  In March 2001 King’s College ‘disowned’ an adverse institutional audit 
report from the QAA ‘claiming that the agency failed to “intellectually engage” with the 
college.’49  In his 2000 essay Randall had written that ‘[t]he sanction of loss of funding is 
available if quality is found wanting’.50  However that sanction lay with HEFCE as the funding 
body not with the QAA.  In the same month as the Kings report was published the Board of 
the London School of Economics passed a motion saying that it would secede from the QAA 
because ‘it [the QAA] infringed academic freedom, imposed its own bureaucratic and 
pedagogical agenda, neglected student “intellectual development” and used incompetent 
and unprofessional reviewers’.51  Again in the same month the Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment suddenly announced, seemingly without consulting the QAA, 
that there was to be a 40 per cent reduction in the amount of external audit of universities 
by the QAA.52  After negotiations between various parties, including the QAA, a much 
reduced process of audit was agreed.53  Six months later Randall resigned from the QAA.54  
Brown has observed that after what he referred to as ‘the Russell Group’s putsch’ ‘the 
agency had effectively been sidelined’.55   
 
 
48 Tapper op cit 177. 
49 Times Higher Education Supplement 23rd March 2001.  . 
50 Randall, 2000 op cit 167. 
51 Times Higher Education Supplement 23rd March 2001.    
52 Brown op cit 131.  What exactly precipitated this decision is unclear.  Brown suggests that 
it was due to a combination of factors including lobbying by ‘prominent Russell Group vice-
chancellors’ (Brown loc cit).  Tapper suggest that whilst ‘[t]his may have been the case…[this 
ought to be put] in the context of the persistent and broadly-based opposition of many pre-
1992 universities to the quality assurance regime from 1992 onwards’ (Tapper op cit 184) 
53 Brown op cit 134. 
54 Brown op cit 146. 
55 Brown op cit 140 and 147.  See further David Laughton ‘Why Was the QAA Approach to 
Teaching Quality Assessment Rejected by Academics in UK HE? (2003) 28 Assessment & 
Evaluation 309.  Randall continued his lonely campaign even after his resignation from the 
QAA.  He concluded a 2002 article with the statement that ‘[f]or too long the providers of 
higher education have behaved like princes of all they survey.  It is time for the consumer to 
be king’ (John Randall ‘Quality Assurance: Meeting the Needs of the Consumer’ (2002) 56 
Higher Education Quarterly 188 at 202).  This echoes his 2000 suggestion that students were 
universities’ ‘primary client’ (Randall, 2000 op cit 165).  An extensive literature on the notion 
of students as consumers now exists.  However it is worth noting that a 2017 survey of UK 
undergraduates based on, amongst other things, interviews with 1019 students found that 
53 per cent of students did not see themselves as customers in relation to their university 
(Education, Consumer Rights and Maintaining Trust: What Students Want from their 
University (Universities UK, 2017) 4 and 5.  See also Louise Bunce, Amy Baird and Siân Jones 
‘The 
student-as-consumer approach in higher education and its effects on academic 
performance’ (2017) 42 Studies in Higher Education 1958 at 1960-1961. 
Nothing in the analysis above should be taken to argue that universities or individual 
academics found the new QAA arrangements that were put into place to be entirely 
satisfactory.   On the contrary it is easy to show that many academics felt that the ‘[e]xternal 
quality monitoring had become burdensome’.56  Equally many found the resultant internal 
systems in their universities to be ‘overly bureaucratic’.57  Nevertheless it is hard to 
conclude that this history is one of audit processes simply being imposed on academics and 
universities.  Whilst the systems, both external and internal, might constrain universities 
and academics and to some extent comprise their autonomy and their academic freedom 
universities and individual academics were part of the process, and sometimes a vital part of 
the process, that settled the degree of constraint and the form of compromise.  As Tapper 
has written, commenting generally on the process of quality assurance in higher education 
in the United Kingdom, ‘[i]t seems that no regulatory authority can operate without the 
support of those whom it regulates’.58 
 
The Advertising Standards Authority 
 
Neither the manner in which the Law Benchmark was arrived at nor the way in which 
institutional audit was introduced into universities suggest that audit was simply imposed 
onto universities.  Consideration of the work of the Advertising Standards Authority with 
respect to universities introduces a further layer of complexity into the relationship 
between universities, individual academics and audit regimes. 
 
The Advertising Standards Authority unquestionably has a role in auditing the work of 
universities.  Universities produce material which is subject to both the ‘UK Code of Non-
broadcast Advertising and Direct & Promotional Material (CAP Code)’ and the ‘UK Code of 
Broadcast Advertising (BCSAP Code)’.59  There is a complaints system with respect to both 
Codes.60  Complaints can be made by members of the public, competitors to those who 
have issued the advertising that is the subject of a complaint or members of a group with an 
‘obvious interest’ in the advertising.61 
 
Complaints about university advertising have usually related to claims about a university’s 
status in relation to other universities.62  In 2016 the ASA ruled on two complaints made 
 
56 Lee Harvey ‘A history and critique of quality evaluation in the UK’ (2005) 13 Quality 
Assurance in Education 263 at 271. 
57 Andreas Hoecht ‘Quality assurance in UK higher education: Issues of trust, control, 
professional autonomy and accountability’ (2006) 51 Higher Education 541 at 555. 




62 The ASA has issued advice to universities about how they can make comparative claims in 
such a way as to be compliant with the ASA’s Codes (https://www.asa.org.uk/advice-
online/universities-comparative-claims.html). 
about the University of Law’s advertising.63  One complaint was about the University of 
Law’s claim that it was ‘the UK’s leading law school’.  As is usual in such cases the ASA asked 
for evidence to substantiate this claim.  Since it was unconvinced that readers would 
interpret the advertising in a way that was consistent with the evidence that the University 
of Law provided the ASA found against the University of Law.  The second complaint was 
about the University of Law’s claims for the salary levels that were attained by successful 
students.  Once again the ASA found that the evidence the University of Law supplied was 
not consistent with the way in which the advertising was likely to be read and so found 
against the University of Law.   However it is not the way in which the ASA regulated the 
University of Law that is of the greatest interest for the arguments in this essay; instead the 
most interesting matter is the identity of the complainants.  One case against the University 
of Law was brought by a ‘university law lecturer’ and one by a ‘retired university law 
professor’. 
 
It is not entirely surprising to find complaints against universities being brought by 
academics.   In an analysis of who complainants to the ASA are Crosier and Erdogan describe 
them at one point as being those who were ‘well-educated, well-off, exhibited some 
bohemian tendencies, [and] identified with the chattering classes’.64  Elsewhere they write 
that a ‘pychographic profile’ of complainants that they complied showed ‘a clear picture of a 
social group not far removed from a mixture of university lecturers and the legendary 
“Disgusted of Tunbridge Wells”’.65  Legal academics are certainly not the only academics to 
have made complaints to the ASA.  A complaint about the University of Strathclyde’s claim 
that its Physics department was ‘ranked No 1 in the UK’ and that it was ‘number one in the 
UK for research in the REF 2014’ was made by ‘an academic’.66  The fact that academics can 
and do make complaints about universities to the ASA is important when considering the 
ASA as a regulator of universities.  The ASA itself monitors advertising and has its own 
Compliance team.67  It is thus an independent regulator in the same sense that, for example, 
the QAA is a regulator.  Equally, even when it considers complaints made to it, the ASA 
makes its own judgements about whether or not there has been a breach of one of its 
Codes.  Nevertheless the ASA is not just a regulator imposed on universities; it also can be 
and sometimes is something that individual academics use to help ensure that standards 
that they think are important are upheld.68 
 
The Changing Role of the University? 
 
 
63 An account of the complaints and the ASA rulings is to be found at 
https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/the-university-of-law-ltd-and-marketing-vf-ltd-a16-
346902.html. 
64 Keith Crosier and Zafer Erdogan ‘Advertising Complainants: who and where are they?’ 
(2001) 7 Journal of Marketing Communications 109 at 115. 
65 Crosier and Erdogan op cit 118. 
66 ASA Ruling on University of Strathclyde https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/university-of-
strathclyde-a17-390134.html.  The complaints were upheld. 
67 https://www.asa.org.uk/advice-online/universities-comparative-claims.html. 
68 On this see further Anthony Bradney ‘The success of university law schools in England and 
Wales: Or how to fail’ The Law Teacher (forthcoming). 
Regulation of the university is intimately bound up with questions about the role of the 
university.  Thus, for example, the external audit of research in universities was first brought 
in at the behest of the then Conservative Government in the 1980s.  However what that 
Government sought was not simply a record of what research was being done but also 
reassurance that research funding was ‘effectively deployed’ which in turn meant that 
research would ‘contribute more effectively to the improvement of the performance of the 
economy’.69 
 
Successive British governments of varying political persuasions have followed the 1980s 
Conservative Government in arguing that universities ought to direct their attention to 
servicing the needs of the economy in various ways.  There is little to choose between the 
Conservative Government’s 1985 paper above and the then Labour Government’s 2009 
proposition in Higher Ambitions that ‘higher education is, and will continue to be, central to 
this country’s economic performance in the twenty-first century’.70  Similarly the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government which followed the Labour 
administration said ‘[t]he Government believes that our universities are essential for 
building a strong and innovative economy. We will take action to create more college and 
university places, as well as help to foster stronger links between universities, colleges and 
industries’.71  Its 2010 White Paper Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System 
stated that ‘[o]ur reforms aim to make the English higher education system more responsive 
to students and employers’.72  The argument that students are prospective employees and 
research should be about economic productivity is repeated in almost every government 
pronouncement on universities during the last three or four decades.   
 
Yet, having noted the links that governments think there ought to be between universities 
and the economy, it is important not to overstate this message.  Higher Ambitions, for 
example, also accepts that ‘[r]esearch and learning universities have intrinsic value aside 
from any economic considerations’.73  Students at the Heart of the System says that ‘[h]igher 
education is a good thing in itself. Students may study a subject because they love it 
regardless of what it means for their earnings’.74  David Willetts, the then Minister for 
Universities and Science, who co-authored a foreword to Students at the Heart of the 
System later wrote, in a book published after he had left office, that ‘[e]ducation is 
worthwhile in its own right, not just as a means to something else.  Knowledge is better 
 
69 The Development of Higher Education into the 1990s (Cmnd 9524, 1985) para 9.1 and para 
1.2.  For a history of early iterations of this exercise which concludes that the exercise was 
ineffective in redirecting research towards the needs of the economy see Katherine Barker 
‘The UK Research Assessment Exercise: the evolution of a national research evaluation 
system’ (2007) 16 Research Evaluation 3. 
70 Higher Ambitions: The future of universities in a knowledge economy (BIS, 2009) 53.  
Higher Ambitions said, amongst other things, that the Labour Government would 'ask all 
universities to produce a statement on how they promote student employability…’ (Higher 
Ambitions op cit 51). 
71 The Coalition: our programme for government” (Cabinet Office, 2010) 31. 
72 Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System (2011) Cm 8122 27. 
73 Higher Ambitions op cit 41. 
74 Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System op cit 38 (see also 14). 
than ignorance.’75  Nor is the acceptance of the notion of education, including higher 
education, as an inherent good confined to governments; it also extends to regulators. 
When Sir Michael Barber gave his first speech as the incoming chair of the Office for 
Students to Universities UK, the representative body for UK universities, he said that 
 
‘[t]he acquisition of knowledge - for its own sake - and critical thinking capacity remain 
fundamental. The challenge is to engender the skills that will allow graduates to thrive in a 
global economy which is changing rapidly and fundamentally and, at the same time, to 
engender a love of knowledge and an endless curiosity.’76 
 
This passage came in a section of his speech devoted to employability for students.  
Nevertheless the chair of the Office for Students, the regulator with statutory responsibility 
for the student experience, chose to assert the importance of knowledge for its own sake 
when making an important early speech at the beginning of his period of office.  Once again 
examples of such beliefs and statements by regulators could be multiplied.77  Governments 
and regulators strongly believe that British universities ought to service the economy but 




The fact that governments and regulators have spent over three decades trying to redirect 
the focus of British universities to the economy is testament to the weakness of their 
position.  Successive commentators have noted the continuing power of traditional 
conceptions of universities as places for the disinterested pursuit of learning and 
knowledge.  In her study of academic identity Henkel, for example, wrote that ‘liberal 
educational ideals still had a significant part in academic discourse’.78  In a similar fashion 
Tight contended that what he calls ‘the English idea of the university remains both a 
coherent and highly influential model’.79  Academics are, of course, aware that what they 
would like the university to be does not fit in with prevailing political mores.  Bosetti and 
Walker observed that the ten Vice-Chancellors that they interviewed saw this as being one 
of their key challenges.80  In one sense this is neither unsurprising nor new.  ‘The mystery of 
academia…is how it manages to flourish in a social setting that would seemingly be hostile 
to its assumptions’.81 For many in universities in England and Wales the question is how to 
best manage this situation.  As one Vice-Chancellor has written ‘[t]o be business-like [in 
 
75 David Willetts A University Education (Oxford University Press, 2007) 122. 
76 Sir Michael Barber, chair Office for Students, speech to Universities UK, 23rd June 2017, 
http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/news/Pages/sir-michael-barber-speech-uuk-june-2017. 
77 Even John Randall wrote that students might pursue knowledge for its own sake (Randall, 
2002 op cit 189). 
78 Mary Henkel Academic Identities and Policy Change in Higher Education (Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers, 2000) 256. 
79 Malcom Tight the Development of Higher Education in the United Kingdom since 1945 
(Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press, 2009) 316. 
80 Lynn Bosetti and Keith Walker ‘Perspectives of UK Vice-Chancellors on Leading 
Universities in a Knowledge-Based Economy’ (2010) 64 Higher Education Quarterly 4 at 6. 
81 William Brown Academic Politics (University of Alabama Press, 1982) 37. 
running a university] does not mean that we must become businesses’.82  There are 
pressures upon universities and individual academics in England and Wales, as there always 
have been.  These pressures, especially on individual academics, may be much greater now 
than they have been in the past.83  However this does not mean that universities or 




The sections of this essay above demonstrate how universities and individual academics 
have sought to navigate an acceptable course for themselves during a period when doubts 
have been raised about the acceptability of academic autonomy.  Opinions about how 
successful they have been will vary.  Yet the fact of resistance to control cannot be denied.  
In this context, it becomes clear that university law schools in England and Wales determine 
the nature of university legal education.  As with their parent institutions their legal position 
and the reality of their everyday lives are in accord in giving them agency with respect to 
what they do.  Others outside the university will have views about what the legal academy 
should do.  The final responsibility for deciding what does happen rests with academics.  
Trow has distinguished the private life of a university from its public life.84  What goes on in 
lectures and seminars is in the end a matter of the private life of a university, something 
that is determined by those who do the teaching.85  How they should use this control is not 
the subject of this essay.  There are a range of opinions within the legal academy as to the 
direction that university law schools ought to take.86  There is however one final matter that 
constrains the decision that legal academics make about how they exercise their control 
over university legal education; that is academic freedom. 
 
Academic freedom is more properly conceptualised as an obligation than as a right.  
‘Professors and others who teach in universities…have a paradigmatic duty to discover and 
teach what they find important and true…’.87  What law schools and legal academics choose 
to do in legal education is a matter for them but what they choose must be what they think 
 
82 Gerard Pillay ‘Valuing higher education’ (2009) 42 Higher Education Review 64 at 66.  
Elsewhere in his article Pillay writes that ‘the university is among the few custodians of the 
quality of culture and its intellectual sustainability and depth’ (Pillay op cit 71). 
83 See, for example, Liz Morrish and Helen Saunton ‘Performance Management and the 
Stifling of Academic Freedom and Production’ (2016) 29 Journal of Historical Sociology 42. 
84 Martin Trow ‘The Public and Private Lives of Higher Education’ (1975) 104 Daedalus 365. 
85 This not, of course, to deny that others both within and from outside the university may 
seek to influence what academics do in their teaching. 
86 Cownie, 2204 op cit 30-35.  It is, however, clear that for those in law schools, as with the 
rest of the university, notions of a liberal education continue to dominate thinking (Cownie, 
2004 op cit 76-78).  Academic drift, the ‘tendency of institutions to aspire to and work 
towards higher status’, is likely to have an impact on choices that are made (Malcom Tight 
‘Theory development and application in higher education: the case of academic drift’ (2015) 
47 Journal of Educational Administration and History 84 at 94. 
87 Ronald Dworkin ‘A New Interpretation of Academic Freedom’ in Louis Menard (ed) The 
Future of Academic Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1996) 189.  
is important and true not what others think is important and true.88  If they do anything 




        
 
 
           
 
 
88 See further Anthony Bradney ‘The necessary loneliness of teaching (and of being a legal 
academic)’ in Bart von Klink and Ubaldus de Vries Academic Learning in Law: Theoretical 
Positions, Teaching Experiments and Learning Experiences (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 
82-85. 
